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Taylor et al.: Updates from the Regional Human Rights Systems

UPDATES FROM THE REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEMS
INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM
THE UNITED STATES VIOLATES THE
HUMAN RIGHTS OF A DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE VICTIM AND HER CHILDREN
In August 2011, the Inter-American
Commission
on
Human
Rights
(Commission) published its merits report
on a petition submitted by the American
Civil Liberties Union on behalf of Jessica
Lenahan (formerly Gonzales) of Castle
Rock, Colorado against the United States
(U.S.). The Commission found that the
U.S. had violated Lenahan’s three daughters’ rights to life, equal protection, and
special protection as girl-children.
Lenahan v. U.S. is the first case brought
against the U.S. before the Commission
that draws domestic violence into the
international human rights arena. The
Commission’s decision emphasizes states’
obligations to protect people from recognized dangers, an obligation the U.S.
Supreme Court rejects.
In May 1999, Lenahan was granted a
restraining order against her estranged and
violent husband, Simon Gonzales, also
the girls’ father. The following month,
Gonzales took her daughters without
informing Lenahan, violating the restraining order that had granted Lenahan sole
physical custody. In clear distress, Lenahan
communicated with the Castle Rock Police
Department (Police Department) eight
times in ten hours. Her complaints were
summarily dismissed. When Gonzales
drove to the police station and opened
fire, police returned fire, killing him.
Afterwards, the officers found the girls’
bodies in Gonzales’ truck, though it
remains unclear whether they were killed
by Gonzales or by the officers’ return fire.
Lenahan filed suit against the town
of Castle Rock for failing to protect her
daughters. Lenahan argued that the town
deprived her of her property interest in
the restraining order without due process of law when the Police Department
failed to enforce the restraining order.
The District Court dismissed the case
because it found no evidence of a viola-

tion of Lenahan’s right to due process. The
Court of Appeals found that Lenahan had
a cognizable procedural due process claim
and remanded for further consideration.
Castle Rock sought certiorari, and the U.S.
Supreme Court accepted the case in 2004.
In June 2005, the Supreme Court ruled that
Castle Rock had not violated Lenahan’s
due process rights. Instead, it found that
Colorado’s statute did not obligate the
Police Department to respond to her complaints, but permitted officers to exercise
discretion over enforcing the restraining
order.

aware the three girls were in danger and
failed to protect them, thus violating their
right to life (Article I) under the American
Declaration. In issuing the restraining order
against Gonzales, the police had acknowledged the risk he posed to Lenahan and her
daughters, creating an obligation to protect
them from that risk. Furthermore, since the
U.S. did not conduct a “prompt, thorough,
exhaustive and impartial” investigation
into the girls’ deaths, it violated their rights
to equal protection (Article II), judicial
protection (Article XVIII), and special protection as girl-children (Article VII).

Having exhausted her domestic remedies, Lenahan petitioned the Commission
to hear her case in December 2005, arguing
that the U.S. had violated her daughters’
right to life when it failed to protect them
from a known danger. The Commission
found the case admissible in July 2007.
Before the Commission, the U.S. contested
that Lenahan had informed the officers
of the valid restraining order and that she
had adequately communicated the danger
Gonzales presented to her children. The
U.S. also claimed that Lenahan did have
full access to judicial process, and that
the Supreme Court’s ruling against her did
not indicate that she was denied judicial
protection.

The Commission reiterated that the
norms embodied by the American
Declaration are recognized as a source of
legal obligation for all OAS member states
and therefore, the U.S. should adhere to
them. The Commission concluded the merits report by recommending that the U.S.
thoroughly investigate the girls’ deaths,
provide reparations to Lenahan, and adopt
legislation requiring the enforcement of
restraining orders and the protection of
children harmed by domestic violence.
Although the Commission cannot enforce
compliance with its recommendations, the
decision does serve as persuasive authority,
as well as an admonition of the U.S.’s lack
of protection of domestic violence victims
and survivors.

Notably, the U.S. claimed that the
American Declaration on the Rights and
Duties of Man (American Declaration)
does not impose an affirmative duty to
protect individuals from private actors
and that, given the information it alleged
was provided by Lenahan, the Police
Department responded in accordance with
its obligations under domestic and international law. The U.S. argued that even if the
American Declaration did impose an affirmative duty, it is merely a declaration of
human rights principles and not a binding
legal instrument. Moreover, the U.S. contended that the Commission’s recommendations do not create any legal obligations
because it has not ratified the American
Convention on Human Rights (American
Convention).
The Commission held in its merits
report, however, that the U.S. was in fact
44

VENEZUELA FAILS TO ADHERE TO
INTER-AMERICAN COURT RULING
In September 2011, the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights (Inter-American
Court) ruled in López Mendoza v.
Venezuela that the State had violated presidential candidate Leopoldo López’s right
to be elected by prohibiting him from
holding public office. Though the decision is binding on Venezuela since it is
a party to the American Convention on
Human Rights (American Convention),
it is unclear whether Venezuela will heed
the ruling. The State’s Supreme Court of
Justice recently overruled López Mendoza
v. Venezuela, declaring the Inter-American
Court’s ruling “unenforceable” because
López is only temporarily barred from
serving in public office and was not denied
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the right to vote or exercise other political rights. Civil society has criticized the
Supreme Court’s decision for flagrantly
ignoring international law.
Leopoldo López is a former mayor
of Chacao who was prohibited from running for mayor of Caracas after the State
brought two corruption charges against
him. López was accused of budgetary and
fiscal irregularities as mayor and as a state
oil company employee. He was tried in
two administrative proceedings and fined.
In 2008, the Supreme Court of Justice
prohibited López, along with 276 other
politicians, from running for public office.
In March 2008, López petitioned the
Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights (Commission) to hear his case,
arguing that his rights to participate in government and to due process had been violated when he was prevented from serving
in an elected position without first being
convicted in a criminal court. He claimed
that an individual could only be prevented
from holding an elected position through
a criminal proceeding. The Commission
found the case admissible in July 2008 and
submitted it to the Inter-American Court
for adjudication in December 2009.
The Inter-American Court ruled that
López’s right to participate in government under Article 23 of the American
Convention was violated when he was
prohibited from holding public office without being convicted by a criminal court.
Additionally, the Inter-American Court
found that the State had violated López’s
right to a defense under Article 8 by not
requiring concrete evidence of López’s corruption in the administrative proceedings
against him. The Inter-American Court
found that the Supreme Court of Justice’s
issuance of a decision after three and a half
years was reasonable considering the case’s
complexity. Finally, it ruled that the State
did not violate López’s right to equality
before the law under Article 24, since there
was insufficient evidence to determine
whether the other 276 candidates prevented
from running for election had been treated
differently.
The State argued before the InterAmerican Court that it had not violated
López’s rights because a criminal conviction was only necessary for the total deprivation of a person’s right to be elected, not
for a temporary sanction. The State also

argued that the administrative process provided an adequate procedure for petitioners
to defend themselves. The Inter-American
Court rejected both arguments by holding
that the right to be elected can only be
restricted after a criminal conviction.
Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez
has expressed disapproval of the InterAmerican Court’s ruling, claiming that it
violates the State’s sovereignty. The State’s
Attorney General brought the issue to the
Supreme Court of Justice in September
2011, which held that the Inter-American
Court’s decision was unenforceable and
that López’s political rights had not been
violated. The Supreme Court of Justice
determined that López would not be
allowed to serve in public office despite a
Constitutional provision according international treaties the same weight as domestic
law. The Supreme Court of Justice decision
clarified that López is only prohibited from
actually serving in an elected position, not
from running. As of October 19, 2011,
Lopez is now running for president, having
been granted permission by the Consejo
Nacional Electoral (National Electoral
Council, CNE). The CNE, deriving its
authority from Venezuela’s Constitution,
was designed to be insulated from the
political process.
This is not the first time President
Chávez and his administration have used
the courts to assert political power. In
May 2004, President Chávez signed a
law increasing the number of Supreme
Court justices and creating two new
methods of removing justices. The law
facilitates filling the available positions
with justices who are likely to support
President Chávez’s policies. A February
2010 Commission report found that the
State intimidates and punishes those with
contrary political opinions. In addition, the
State has increased the scope of its insult
laws and the penalty for “incitement,”
which gives the government censorship
power. These laws and reports, along with
the Supreme Court of Justice’s recent decision, indicate that Venezuela is continuing
to use all three branches of government to
repress political opposition. Though the
CNE’s decision to allow López to register contrary to President Chávez’s wishes
could be an indication of coming change,
it remains to be seen whether the Supreme
Court of Justice would allow López to take
office if elected.
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Anna Taylor, a J.D. candidate at the
American University Washington College
of Law, covers the Inter-American System
for the Human Rights Brief.

EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
ECTHR DECISION FOR RUSSIAN
OIL COMPANY EMPHASIZES FOCUS
ON PROCEDURAL HUMAN RIGHTS
VIOLATIONS
The European Court of Human Rights
(ECtHR) ruled on September 20, 2011,
that Russia violated defunct Russian oil
company Yukos’ rights to property and a
fair trial but dismissed charges that the
acts were politically motivated. The case
of Yukos v. Russia arose from a tax-evasion
investigation that bankrupted one of the
country’s largest companies and jailed two
of its top executives. Corporate plaintiffs, while permitted, are uncommon under
Article 34 of the ECHR, which allows
individuals, non-governmental organization, and any “group of people” to bring a
case against any country that is party to the
convention. In ECtHR jurisprudence, the
occurrence of cases brought by companies
or individuals with corporate interests are
rare, accounting for only 3.8 percent of the
1998-2003 case law.
Yukos filed a claim with the ECtHR
shortly after the Russian Tax Ministry
issued an initial ruling in April 2004 that
because the company had used illegal tax
shelters, it owed $2.88 billion, a figure that
eventually grew to more than $10 billion.
Immediately after the ruling, the government began freezing the company’s assets,
and within three months, Yukos’ claim in
the Moscow City Commercial Court and
its subsequent appeal were denied and
the government sold a large part of the
company. By 2007, after exhausting all
domestic appeals and failing to strike an
agreement with the Tax Ministry for repayment, the company dissolved. Yukos’ complaint to the ECtHR alleged that the speed
of the proceedings violated Russian law
and prevented an adequate defense under
Article 6 of the European Convention on
Human Rights (ECHR). The complaint
further alleged that the tax enforcement
and selling of assets were “unlawful, arbitrary and disproportionate” under Article 1
of Protocol 1 and Articles 1, 7, 13, 14, and
18 of the ECHR.
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The ECtHR Chamber found that the
proceedings moved faster than the already
rapid Russian legal system allows and violated minimum protections under Article
6(3) by failing to provide adequate time to
review all the relevant material, some of
which was provided just four days before
the initial trial. The Chamber further found
Russia in violation of Article 1 of Protocol
1—the right to property—by assessing disproportionate fines and prematurely seizing company assets. The ECtHR also ruled,
however, that because the tax investigation
was legitimate and no evidence was provided that other companies used Yukos’
methods, there were no grounds for claims
of prejudicial treatment.
The human rights community has
been critical of the Yukos case, especially of the potentially political undertones of dismantling Yukos and jailing it’s
CEO Mikhail Khodorkovsky, a critic of
the Putin administration whom Amnesty
International declared in 2011 a “prisoner
of conscience.” The claims of political
prejudice failed in both the Yukos case and
Khodorkovsky’s own case earlier this year.
Antoine Buyse, senior researcher at the
Netherlands Institute of Human Rights in
Utrecht, explained that because the ECtHR
is concerned about Russia implementing
its rulings, “the court prefers to stay on
firm ground and finds violations which can
be clearly argued.”
Such an approach is common with the
court’s history of finding procedural human
rights violations with the ECtHR basing
nearly half of its decisions from 19592009 in a right to a fair trial. The other
issue in the Yukos case, the protection of
property, is the second most cited right in
the ECtHR’s jurisprudence. By dismissing
the issue of political prejudice in the Yukos
trial, the court averts a decision that would
be much less palatable to Russia, which is
the defendant state in nearly a quarter of
new cases brought in 2009. The ECtHR’s
decision may thus appear at odds with the
concept of broad human rights protection,
but the court is unlike many other bodies
in that its decisions are binding across the
47 member states of the Council of Europe.
Given the mandate of the ECtHR and the
political conditions in its member states,
the case might be a template for a permanent, regional body to successfully protect
the human rights of an entire continent
while maintaining relations and sustaining
cooperation from member states.

TWO DECISIONS EXPAND
EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OF
EUROPEAN COURT
Judicial enforcement of human rights
violations during foreign intervention was
expanded by two Grand Chamber decisions handed down by the European Court
of Human Rights (ECtHR) in July 2011.
Both cases arise from the war in Iraq,
where the human rights community has
voiced frustration over perceived violations
by occupying powers.
In Al-Skeini and others v. the United
Kingdom, the ECtHR expanded its
extraterritorial jurisdiction to apply the
European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR) outside the borders of its member
states. Previous jurisprudence had limited
such application to nations over which a
European state controls—a standard of
occupation much higher than the UK’s
involvement in Iraq. British troops joined
the initial invasion in 2003, and the United
Kingdom (UK) was responsible for security in the region of southern Iraq in which
the six Iraqi nationals whose families filed
suit were killed in 2003. The families
claim British soldiers were responsible
and brought the ECtHR suit over allegedly
inadequate investigations by the British
government into the deaths. The ECtHR
rejected the UK’s claim that the ECHR
did not apply, noting that there still existed
restrictions on application outside of borders, but that under the special circumstance where a country “exercised public
powers on the territory of another State,”
jurisdiction could be established by control
over that territory’s people. Specifically,
the ECtHR’s conclusion established jurisdiction within ECHR Article 1, the obligation to protect. Once that bar was met, the
ECtHR found a violation of Article 2—the
right to life—for the failure to investigate.
In a separate decision issued the same
day, the ECtHR further expanded the
court’s jurisdiction in Iraq to cover a member state’s detention of a man, without
trial, for suspected terrorist recruitment. In
Al-Jedda v. the United Kingdom, an Iraqi
man with British citizenship was held in a
UK-controlled detention facility in Iraq for
three years before being stripped of his citizenship but released without charges. The
ECtHR found the British government in
violation of ECHR Article 5.1—the right
to liberty and security—after the court dismissed the claim that UN Security Council
Resolution 1546, which authorized the
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war, superseded the ECHR and bound the
British government to reject the convention. The court did not completely rule out
the possibility that a UN resolution could
supersede application of the ECHR, but
limited it to instances where the resolution
was specific.
The decision in Al-Skeini has been
heralded as a landmark case by human
rights groups, who see it as facilitating
the universal application of international
human rights law. “The European Court
has spoken clearly—Britain can’t claim its
soldiers have no human rights duties once
they are in another country,” said Clive
Baldwin, senior legal advisor to Human
Rights Watch. “The British government
should now finally accept human rights law
applies to its acts anywhere in the world
and ensure a full and independent inquiry
into all these killings.” The decision raises
questions about the extraterritorial jurisdiction of other human rights institutions
as applied to Iraq and the so-called global
war on terror. Serious allegations of violations—for instance, against the United
States Justice Department’s decision not
to investigate acts of torture by CIA interrogators—are often brought by victims or
human rights groups that have been left
with little judicial recourse. Although the
ECtHR decision would not apply to the
United States, if such allegations were to
implicate a European citizen, there could
be a method for victims or rights advocates
to seek redress after the court’s decisions in
Al-Skeini and Al-Jedda.
Additional cases concerning the
UK’s involvement in Iraq could follow
at the ECtHR, or domestic courts may
begin to adhere to the new precedent.
Extraterritorial jurisdiction could also
become relevant with Europe’s lead in supporting the Arab Spring, especially Libya.
Under current circumstances, it is unlikely
the ECtHR would rule that any member
state meets the jurisdictional standards
in Libya unless involvement expands.
However, as member states consider the
nature of their involvement or occupation
abroad, the Al-Skeini and Al-Jedda decisions could, taken together, guide military
policy and influence the legal approach of
human rights groups to alleged violations.
Matthew Lopas, a J.D. candidate at the
American University Washington College
of Law, covers the European Court of
Human Rights for the Human Rights Brief.
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AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM
AFRICAN COMMITTEE FINDS KENYA
IN VIOLATION OF THE RIGHTS AND
WELFARE OF THE CHILD
In its landmark decision in Nubian
Minors v. Kenya, the African Committee of
Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the
Child (Committee) for the first time found
that the Government of Kenya had violated
the African Charter on the Rights and
Welfare of the Child (Children’s Charter) in
its treatment of Kenyan children of Nubian
descent. As an organization with a mandate
to protect and promote rights and welfare
of the child, the Committee oversees the
implementation of the Children’s Charter.
Accordingly, following a Communication
filed by the Institute for Human Rights
and Development in Africa (IHRDA) and
Open Society Justice Initiative (OSJI),
the Committee found that the Kenyan
government has failed to ensure Nubian
children the right to Kenyan citizenship at
birth, which creates a myriad of obstacles
throughout their development.
Though Article 14 of the 2010 Kenyan
Constitution confers citizenship to persons
born within the country with at least one
parent also born in Kenya, Nubians have
historically been considered aliens without protection and benefits of citizenship
despite meeting the legal requirements.
Consequently, Nubian children grow up
virtually stateless, without the citizenship
status afforded to all other children born
within Kenya’s borders. According to the
Communication, public hospitals in Kenya
routinely deny Nubian parents birth certificates for their children, often providing the pretext that the parents—having
faced discrimination themselves—lack
valid identification. Without a birth certificate, Nubian children are thereafter
denied essential government benefits, such
as access to education and health care. By
age 18, they must undergo a complex and
lengthy vetting process to obtain an identification card that proves their Kenyan
citizenship. As adults without the proper
identification, Nubians will not have the
right to own property and they will face
many obstacles when seeking employment.
Taken together, these forms of state-sponsored discrimination trap Nubian children
in poverty and limit their opportunities for
personal development.

As a State Party to the Children’s
Charter, Kenya has an obligation to protect
the rights of children. Pursuant to Article
44 of the Charter, the Committee has
jurisdiction to review the Communication
against Kenya. Specifically, IHRDA and
OSJI alleged violations of Article 6(2),
6(3), and 6(4), which guarantee the right
to nationality upon birth and the proper
registration of such. The IHRDA and OSJI
further alleged violations of Article 3,
which prohibits unlawful discrimination
inter alia based on ethnicity, and Articles
11(3) and 14(2), which grant equal access
to education and health care, respectively.
In its decision, the Committee found
that under Article 6(4), Kenya is required
to take measures to ensure that children
have nationality upon birth. The Committee
also found that Kenya violated Article 3,
because of a discriminatory practice in the
country toward children protected under
the Charter that does not serve a legitimate
state interest, but rather renders Nubian
children stateless. The Committee also held
that limited access to education and healthcare stemmed from a preexisting violation
of Articles 6(2) and 6(3). The Committee
recommended that Kenya take legislative
and administrative measures to ensure that
Nubian children received citizenship, and
to implement a non-discriminatory birth
registration practices. The Committee also
recommended that Kenya report on the
implementation of such measures within
six months.
The decision is a milestone in the
fulfillment of a founding principle of
the Charter, to ensure the rights of children regardless of race or ethnicity. The
Committee’s decision is made publicly
available, and Kenya is required to submit
a report on measures implemented to comply with the decision. Accordingly, Kenya
has to institute mechanisms to ensure that
hospitals allow Nubian parents to register
their children at birth. The Committee will
appoint a member responsible for monitoring compliance. In the face of noncompliance, the Committee may consider bringing the case to the African Court on Human
and Peoples’ Rights, pursuant to Article 5
of the Court’s founding Protocol.
Following the Committee’s finding, the Citizenship Rights in Africa
Initiative has submitted a recommendation to the Task Force on Citizenship and
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Related Provisions of the Constitution,
calling for a complete revision of the
Citizenship Act to confer citizenship to
individuals born to stateless parents in
Kenya. Established by Kenya’s Minister
of State for Immigration and Registration
of Persons, the task force should act on
the recommendation to supplement the
citizenship provision of the constitution to
comply with the recommendation of the
Committee. With no supporting legal foundation, the Kenyan vetting process—which
requires an additional proof of identity for
Nubians and an interview before a vetting
committee to obtain identification document—should also be revoked. Ultimately,
Kenya ought to grant Nubian children
citizenship to demonstrate its recognition
of Nubians as Kenyans by birth, entitled to
equal benefits and protection afford to all
citizens in the country.

THE KAMPALA CONVENTION: BRIDGING
THE GAP IN THE PROTECTION OF
INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS IN THE
AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM
Forced to leave their homes due to
violent conflicts, gross human rights violations or natural disasters, an estimated
12 million people in Africa are classified
as internally displaced persons (IDPs),
among the most vulnerable groups with
little to no legal protection in the African
human rights system. IDPs do not cross
international borders, and therefore are not
beneficiaries of international laws protecting refugees. IDPs are often forced into
host communities within their countries
where they continue to face security risks
while also confronting hardships accessing
basic necessities, such as food and water.
Though IDPs in Africa are entitled to the
general rights and protections enshrined
in regional human rights instruments, such
protections do not address the concerns
unique to them. In 2009, the African Union
(AU) unanimously adopted the Convention
for the Protection and Assistance of IDPs
(Kampala Convention), the first legal
instrument of its kind throughout the international community. While the Kampala
Convention was at the time of its construction a historic advancement—adopted
unanimously by the AU— the document
is to date not legally enforceable because
it has not received ratification by fifteen
countries.
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The Kampala Convention represents the
first attempt by the African Union—and
the international community as a whole—
to enumerate legally binding State Party
obligations toward IDPs. The Kampala
Convention provides legal protection for
IDPs on three fronts: Article 3 requires
signatory states to take steps to prevent
displacement, including incorporating the
Convention into their domestic law to
ensure compliance; Articles 5 and 9 outline state obligations to protect and assist
IDPs once they are displaced, including
facilitating access for humanitarian organizations; and Article 11 requires states to
take measures to sustainably reintegrate
IDPs back into the society. Article 6 outlines the responsibilities of international
organizations and humanitarian agencies
when providing aid. Where States Parties
fail in their obligations, Article 12 compels
them to provide compensation to redress
any transgression the IDP may have suffered as a result, and further seeks to hold
armed forces accountable for any criminal
acts they commit against IDPs.
Many states lack the political will, or
simply do not prioritize the problems of
IDPs in their national agenda. When a
State ratifies the Kampala Convention, it
becomes legally bound to adopt implementing legislation and align its domes-

tic approach to that of the Convention,
which may implicates a change in the
current political culture. Ratification, thus,
requires the concerted political will of
key officials, which seems to be lacking
in those states that have not ratified the
Convention. Specific provisions, such as
Article 10—which requires states to prevent displacement due to private development projects implicates land rights and
foreign investment—and Article 11—
which requires states to provide reparations—leave state parliaments reluctant to
ratify the Convention.
States Parties may also lack the capacity or resources to comply with the obligation of Kampala Convention. In many
states, the needs of IDPs outmatch and
overwhelm the limited resources state budgets can apportion to assist them. However,
though the Kampala Convention places a
heavy—though necessary—financial burden on states to structure their domestic
laws to ensure compliance, this burden is
balanced by Article 8, which articulates the
State’s right to seek assistance from the AU.
Moreover, the Kampala Convention provides for cooperation among states within
the AU, and between states and various
international organizations and humanitarian agencies.
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Thirty-one countries in AU have signed
the Convention without ratification, which,
under customary international law, requires
the signatory states not to act in a way
contrary to the purpose of the Convention
even though it has not entered into force.
Some states, such as Uganda—the first to
ratify—have actively pursued implementation. Prior to ratification in the Gambia,
there was a campaign to educate national
assembly members and various civil society organizations about the benefits of
the Kampala Convention, which seemed
to propel the ratification process. All
African states ought to ratify the Kampala
Convention not only as a way of protecting IDPs once an armed conflict or natural
disaster breaks out, but also as a preventative measure to prevent displacement
before it rises to the level of a humanitarian
crisis. There is a gap in the protection of
IDPs in the African regional human rights
system, and the Kampala Convention is the
legal instrument that will aid in bridging
that gap.
Sarone Solomon, a J.D. candidate at the
American University Washington College
of Law, covers the African Human Rights
System for the Human Rights Brief.

